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COGNITION. CONATION 
AND CONNOTATION 
Anna G. Grebo 
Braintree, Mas$CIchusetts 
Consciousness is essentially a system of meanings that 
may be cognitive (perceptual, conceptual, etc.) or 
affective (values with a conative factor are always 
implied in affectivity.) These two cognitive and affective 
aspects of meaning always go together; none is present 
without the other, although they may be examined 
separately. * 
How little understood are the implications for education of what 
Piaget is saying here was brought home to me strikingly during a 
recent meeting of a graduate seminar in reading. In the course of 
a discussion on what constitutes "appeal" for children of various 
reading materials and methods, one member of the seminar made 
reference to Dr. Richard Jones' Fantasy and Feeling in Education 
(New York University Press, 1968), in which is related a series of 
classroom episodes involving the presentation of sections of ESI's 
much-publicized curriculum, "Man: A Course of Study." The child-
ren-twenty fifth-graders in an experimental summer school in New-
ton, Massachusetts-had just been exposed to vividly colorful and 
powerfully silent films which touched upon the Netsilik Eskimo's 
necessity-enforced cultural pattern of sometimes leaving behind to 
die in the ice and snow the very old (and occasionally the very young-
unwanted girl infants) who were unable to travel from one place 
to another in the never-ending search for food. The children had 
strong emotional reactions to these films, but, rather than stopping to 
explore these, the teachers, for the most part, completed the sug-
gested lesson plans, which attempted to maintain throughout an 
objective focus on the material. 
At this point in our seminar discussion, I interjected that I recalled 
reading further in the same chapter of Dr. Jones' book a communica-
tion from the dance teacher to whom the children went immediately 
following their social studies class. In the memorandum, she had ex-
pressed her consternation at being presented consistently with themes 
of sorrow, death, and abandonment in the children's movement. In 
* Jean Piaget, "The problems of consciousness in child psychology: Develop-
mental changes in awareness," Problems of Consciousness, H. S. Abramson, 
Ed., 1954. 
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short, she objected to her classes becoming almost exclusively a 
cathartic release of emotional tensions engendered by the social 
studies curriculum. 
"But perhaps that's just where they should be expressed" was the 
comment forthcoming from one of the seminar participants-a com-
ment that struck me forcibly as revealing the pivot on which turns 
our conception (and some might say misconception) of the educational 
process. To my mind, the whole cultural bias towards dichotomization 
of intelligence and feeling, thought and emotion, science and art, is 
laid bare in that remark. It belongs to the same category as the com-
monly heard admonition never to mix business and pleasure (or 
friendship.) The underlying assumption of both remarks is that the 
world of public knowledge and the realm of private feeling are 
separate and basically incompatible. 
What my fellow student was expressing was the very common-I 
would say prevalent-attitude among educators that the classroom 
and thus the school is a place to assimilate knowledge and not a 
place to air personal feelings. What one does with the emotional 
"side effects" of learning is a private matter. Hopefully, they will be 
"worked off" in athletics or "expressed" in artistic activities, or at 
worst (or, perhaps, to some minds, at best) simply "forgotten," a 
term which translates into psychoanalyese as "repressed." 
But this attitude just does not take seriously to heart or to mind 
what Piaget and other insightful psychologists and philosophers as 
well as perceptive practitioners of education are saying. True enough, 
the classroom has been set up primarily to facilitate the assimilation 
of knowledge. But the con census of the Magi--of all times and 
climes-is that knowledge without self-knowledge is not worth 
knowing. This is essentially what Piaget is saying when he tells us: 
Intelligence thus begins neither with knowledge of the 
self nor of things as such but with knowledge of their 
interaction, and it is by orienting itself simultaneously 
toward the two poles of that interaction that intel-
ligence organizes the world by organizing itself.* 
It is the self-knowledge pole of that orientation that is lit up in 
the process of "accommodation," the Piagetian term for the reorganiza-
tion of the cognitive structure literally to accommodate the new 
knowledge which, thus transformed, becomes part of the structural 
basis for assimilating even more complex knowledge. Translated into 
* Jean Piaget, Play, Dreams and Imitation in Childhood, Norton, 1951 (1945). 
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practical education terms, this means that without allowance for 
and even aid to the accommodating process (which implies the 
personally evaluative, essentially private sphere of affectivity), sub-
sequent "assimilations" of knowledge can be like so many castles 
constructed on sand. The next shift in the wind of attention will 
disintegrate them; for the underlying foundation that only felt mean-
ing can provide will never have been realized. In reading, this under-
standing-in-depth and integration with already existent structures of 
"prehension" goes, by and large, under the name of comprehension~ 
which term even sounds like what it means-to grasp and create a 
meaningful whole out of garnered information or experience. Knowl-
edge which has not made the connection with the affective schemas 
that results in accommodation and thus in equilibrium is not self-
realized knowledge-knowledge which can expand or raise the level 
of conscious awareness. Thus it is meaningless for the person and 
thereby rendered incapable of entering into subsequent mental develop-
ments. In other words, little "significant" learning has taken place-
a few or more than a few bits and scraps of information committed 
to short-term memory, then reproduced on test paper, without there 
ever having been experienced the meaning without which the knowl-
edge cannot become an integral part of the cognitive equipment 
of the organism. 
Back for a final look at the classroom where the children were 
viewing the films of Eskimo life-presumably one of the main points to 
be gotten across is that man is identifiably Man with ultimately the 
same problems to face however differently he goes about solving them 
within the framework of his particular culture and within the scope 
of his particular level of development. Children denied the opportunity 
of expressing and airing in open discussion their initial reactions of 
repugnance and dismay at disturbing revelations about the Eskimo's 
cultural values and practices will probably not make this primary 
identification of (and more importantly with) the Netsilik as a fellow 
human being, and thereby a valuable opportunity for broadening 
the child's world-view as well as deepening his understanding of 
himself in relation to his own cultural pattern is lost. 
Fortunately not irretrievably so for the twenty Newton youngsters, 
for one of the teachers involved in presenting these studies insisted 
on being permitted to follow her teacher's "instinct" and encouraged 
the children to express openly their honest reactions to the impact 
of such seemingly radically different cultural values. The discussion 
that ensued not only considerably eased the tensions but allowed for 
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the resolution of these conflicts into the realization that providing 
for the very old (and the very young) are problems common to all 
cultures and that death, and thus life, itself is interpreted differently 
in different cultural contexts. After these particularly rewarding (from 
everyone's point of view) sessions, the dance instructor expressed 
her gratitude for no longer having to contend almost exclusively with 
motifs of death and abandonment in the children's movement. She 
could now, she said, begin to lead them into more varied forms of 
expressive movement. 
So many of the tirades against our culture and times have been 
directed at what Owen Barfield has called "the growing general 
sense of meaninglessness." In an article entitled "The Rediscovery 
of Meaning," (Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 7, 1961) he says that 
"It is this which underlies most of the other threats. How is it that 
the more able man becomes to manipulate the world to his advan-
tage, the less he can perceive any meaning in it? ... Penetration to 
the meaning of a thing or process, as distinct from the ability to 
describe it exactly, involves a participation by the knower in the 
known." 
All well and good, one may counter. But, while this is in all 
probability an accurate intuition about where and what the problem 
is, "feeling" and "meaning" have been philosophy's and psychology's 
perennial enigmas, the roots of whose perplexity are sunk so deep 
that one Professor T. H. Pears, writing in 1923 in Remembering and 
Forgetting, said, not altogether facetiously, "If the discovery of the 
psychological nature of Meaning were completely successful, it might 
put an end to psychology altogether." The question remains, just 
how does one go about determining whether a given program of study 
affords optimum conditions for the nurturance of these "esoteric" 
qualities? 
Far from wishing to get enmeshed in a philosophical unravelling 
of the "meaning of meaning," I would like instead simply to throw 
out the suggestion that, in the light of current research and thinking 
about the role of perceptual processes in helping to bring about the 
coalition of affect and intellect which we call understanding, feeling 
and meaning may perhaps be seen to possess a more substantive nature 
than we have hitherto recognized. 
Investigators of the psychology of perception have helped to set 
the stage for a psychological reevaluation of feeling and meaning. 
Gardner Murphy and C. P. Sollery, in their book, Development of 
the Perceptual World (Basic Books, Inc., 1960), point out that most 
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psychological theories implicitly (and psycho-analysis, explicitly) 
acknowledge the close interweaving of perception and cognition with 
the affective processes, especially during childhood. They postulate 
the existence of what they call "primary meanings," which are "dif-
ferentiations of sensory events, of percepts, and of responses which 
occur innately, being part and parcel of the individual's biological 
inheritance" (p. 312). These primary meanings provide the basis 
from which or upon which all subsequent "habits" of differentiating 
or assimilating experience through learning are formed. "As for 
meaning," they write, "we have asserted our belief that meaning is 
essentially differentiation and integration of sensory, perceptual, and 
motor events which have implicative or prognostic value for other 
sensory, perceptual, or motor events" (p. 314). 
Rudolf Arnheim, from the standpoint of the psychology of art, 
views the perceptual process in a similar manner. In an article entitled 
"Perceptual Abstraction and Art," (Psychological Review, 1947, p. 
54), he maintains that "the individual stimulus configuration enters 
the perceptual process only in that it evokes a specific pattern of 
general sensory categories, which stands for the stimulus in a similar 
way in which in a scientific description a network of general concepts 
is offered as the equivalent of a phenomenon of reality." "If this 
theory be acceptable," he goes on to say, "the elementary processes 
of perception, far from being mere passive registration, would be 
creative acts of grasping structures even beyond the mere grasping 
and selecting of parts. What happens in perception would be similar 
to what at a higher psychological level is described as understanding 
or insight." He calls for a new approach-a psychological reevalua-
tion of the relationship between the development of perceptual and 
representational concepts and of mental growth in general. 
In another article, entitled "Visual Thinking," (Education of 
Vision, Gyorgy Kepes, Ed., 1965), he suggests that, in our ignorance 
of the importance of the role of perception in thought processes, we 
may be over-stressing the verbal concept to the neglect of the under-
lying structural sources of meaning. 
But to refute the assumption (that the only possible 
vehicle of concepts are words) it seems to me sufficient 
to point to cats, dogs, monkeys and our own speechless 
infants, who indicate by their behavior that they live in 
a world of constant entities. Indeed, words are but 
labels, and there can be no labelling before the senses 
have furnished defined kinds of things. 
Developmental psychology would seem to offer support to Arn-
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heim's statement. Jonas Langer, writing of cognitive development in 
Theories of Development (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 
points to the findings of Piagetian researchers in their study of the 
relationship of linguistic development to the attainment of the con-
cept of conservation. "Our evidence," they write, "offers little, if 
any, support for the contention that language learning per se con-
tributes to ... the achievement of the conservation concepts." (Inhelder 
et aI., 1966, p. 163). "Such findings," Langer says, "support the 
hypothesis that the meaning of language is not passively acquired 
from environmental sources, but rather is mentally constructed 
(assimilated) by the child to accord with his internal schemes" (p. 
136) . 
In an application of this thought to education, others, like Arn-
heim, are suggesting that we might be short-sightedly, as it were, 
pouring our richest nourishment on the outermost leaves of learning, 
while the roots that must maintain the entire symbolic structure 
wither untended-this in a culture where the "primal sanities" of 
nature, to use Walt Whitman's phrase, are growing ever more 
increasingly imperceptible. 
Along this line, Robert Jay Wolff, in "Visual Intelligence in 
General Education" (Education of Vision)~ decries the lack of 
aesthetic order in today's "man-made" environment and suggests 
that this absence of sensorial and spiritual nourishment in our sur-
roundings coupled with the "pedagogical anxiety to induce quick 
mastery of the signs and symbols of communicable knowledge" may 
be at the bottom of our acknowledged failure to educate, in the 
deepest sense of the word. "Could it be," he asks, "that the college 
sophomore writes badly because his education has neglected to nourish 
in him the experiential sources of good writing in its singleminded 
pursuit of the means?" "One of these sources is the thoughtful eye," 
he maintains, and, "without its guidance, the road to literacy can 
become a grammatical exercise and higher learning a vastly inflated 
kindergarten. " 
Mirko Balsaldella, writing in the same volume, makes explicit 
reference to the process of reading in connection with visual image!)'. 
In his article, "Visual Considerations," he asks us to consider that 
"an idea is expressed by word symbols developed sequentially along 
an imaginary line," and that "the organized 'coming together' of 
these symbols elicits feelings and ideas, evokes images, describes things 
and events." "Basically," he says, "in perceiving an object you see 
only its form and color. For the perception to register in one's mind, 
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it must relate to previous perceptions, to a concept of its essence. 
Otherwise, it is as if we had not seen it, for our memory will have 
retained no trace of it." 
Still others are examining the effects of specific training in per-
ception on the ability to learn how to read. Archie A. Silver, together 
with associates Rosa A. Hagin and Marilyn F. Hersh, published the 
results of their experiments "using the method of stimulation of 
deficit perceptual areas ... to determine whether perception can be 
modified by training and whether increased accuracy of perception is 
reflected in improved reading achievement." In "Reading Disability: 
Teaching Through Stimulation of Deficit Perceptual Areas," American 
Journal of Orthopsychiatry~ 1967,37, pp. 744-752), they report: 
Recent studies have shown that at least the beginning 
aspects of reading are closely related to perceptual 
abilities ... The results so far suggest that where per-
ceptual defects are first trained out, reading instruction 
at intermodal and verbal levels will have a better 
chance of success . . . This principle of enhancing 
neuro-physiological maturation before intermodal and 
verbal methods are introduced has direct implication 
in the prevention of reading and language disability. 
Perceptual training at that critical age when the func-
tion normally develops may indeed enable the child 
to grasp language material which would otherwise 
escape him. 
Some philosophers, among them, Ernst Cassirer, would have us 
realize that meaning inheres not alone in the schematic apperception 
of knowledge but exists apart from and prior to its assimilation by 
cognitive structures-that there are recognizable "expressive char-
acters" which exist in and of themselves. He writes, in The Philosophy 
of Symbolic Forms~ Vol. III: Phenomenology of Knowledge~ (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1957) : 
An expressive character is not a subjective appendage 
that is subsequently and as it were accidentally added 
to the objective content of sensation; on the contrary, 
it is part of the essential fact of perception ... If an 
expressive meaning were not revealed to us in certain 
perceptive experiences, existence would remain silent for 
us . . . What is primarily apprehended here is life as 
such far more than any individual spheres or centers 
of life; what originally appears in expressive percep-
tion is a universal character of reality (pp. 73-74). 
Rudolf Arnheim, too, stresses the universal character of these 
perceptual elements that constitute the basis of all knowledge-
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elements he describes as a "configuration of forces" that is "signi-
ficant not only for the object in whose image it appears, but for the 
physical and mental world in general." In Art and Visual Perception: 
A Psychology of the Creative Eye~ (University of California Press, 
1954), he writes: 
Motifs like rising and falling, dominance and submission, 
weakness and strength, harmony and discord, struggle 
and conformance, underlie all existence. We find them 
within our own mind and in our relations to other people, 
in the human community and in the events of nature. 
Perception of expression fulfills its spiritual mission only 
if we experience in it more than the resonance of our 
own feelings. It permits us to realize that the forces stir-
ring in ourselves are only individual examples of the 
same forces acting throughout the universe. We are 
thus enabled to sense our place in the whole and the 
inner unity of that whole (p. 434). 
Murphy and Solley weave this universal element into their 
psychology of perceptual development, accommodating in their 
theories "both the complex unravelling of symbols as practiced in 
psychoanalysis and the quest for formal principles of structure and 
order, as exemplified in Gestalt psychology." They write further: 
In the same way, as illustrated for example in Rem-
brant's perception of the meaning of the human face, 
or Schubert's and Beethoven's grasp of the possibility 
of transforming a simple melodic line into a breath-
taking new vision of life by adding alterations in tonality 
or rhythm, we have sudden transitions to a higher 
plane-a plane in which a richer isomorphism with 
cosmic structure is achieved than sheer Gestalt prin-
ciples in themselves would require. (Development of the 
Perceptual World) 
Indeed, expressive perception and expressive form would seem 
to have much in common, if they are not identical, with aesthetic 
feeling and artistic form, and, relating this to education, one might 
begin to suspect that aesthetic quality, far from being some sort of 
"fringe benefit" that can be considered only after subsistence has been 
provided for, is to be ignored as a prime criterion of educational 
materials and experiences only at the risk of meaninglessness. 
Donald Arnstine, writing in Philosophy of Education: Learning 
and Schooling (Harper and Row, 1967), forges a link between the 
psychologies of aesthetic perception and education. He writes: 
The arousal of affect, the stirring of emotion felt as 
pleasurable, satisfying or absorbing, through the per-
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ception of form in experiential cues, is a natural way of 
apprehending experience. It is sought after because the 
present is not effaced but rather highlighted and fully 
attended to. It is, in short, during the course of such 
experience that we feel most fully alive. And it is such 
experience that is best characterized as being aesthetic 
in quality ... What could be potentially more impor-
tant in teacher education, then, than the kinds of studies 
in the arts that can make prospective teachers more con-
sciously aware of the features of things (such as lec-
tures and books) that are potential cues for aesthetic 
experience? 
No less renowned a philosopher and interpreter of the arts than 
Sir Herbert Read aligns himself with Arnheim, Cassirer, and the 
others in strongly advocating a policy of education that places the 
training of sensory and perceptual abilities through the arts at its 
center. His thinking seems to embody the "significant configurations" 
of Arnheim and the "expressive characters" of Cassirer as well as 
drawing upon Carl Jung's theory of archetypes. In "Art as a Unifying 
Principle in Education," (Child Art, Hilda Present Lewis, Ed., 1966, 
Diablo Press), he defines consciousness itself as the developing aware-
ness of form, that is, "the ability to retain sensations as images, to 
compare and combine such images into meaningful structures." These 
very structures, he maintains, become a part of the warp and woof 
of the evolving structure of the mind itself. They become the "physically 
determined patterns of perception" that control the "habits" of our 
minds. 
The mind, in its effort to arise from the amorphous 
pool of sensations and feeling, clings to a scaffold of 
precise geometric figures. Nowhere is this more clearly 
demonstrated than in the slow but certain emergence of 
basic form from the apparently aimless scribbling activity 
of a child. Form, the basic pattern, precedes identity, 
precedes significance, controls imagination, determines 
intelligence. The archetypes are the structural elements 
of visual order, of cognition itself, and the archetypes 
are by definition universal. 
Even modern physics seems to have discovered these forms-
"dynamic factors that manifest themselves in impulses ... pieces of 
life itself-images that are integrally connected to the living individual 
by the bridge of the emotion." (C. G. Jung, AI an and His Symbols.) 
In the chapter entitled "Models for Theory" of Visual Thinking, 
Arnheim describes Physicist Gerald Holton's concept of "themata," 
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which the latter considers the underlying principles of scientific con-
ceptions. Themata, says Arnheim, refer to 
thought models that derive neither from empirical 
statements, such as meter readings, nor from analytical 
ones, reliant on the calculus of logic and mathematics. 
Holton does not wish to commit himself as to whether 
these themata should be associated 'with any of the fol-
lowing conceptions: Platonic, Keplerian or Jungian 
archetypes or images; myths (in the non-derogatory 
sense, so rarely used in the English language); syn-
thetic a priori knowledge; intuitive apprehension or 
Galilei's 'reason'; a realistic or absolutistic or, for that 
matter, any other philosophy of science.' 
Arnheim himself says, "I am treating these themata as mental 
images, and I trust that even persons who like to distinguish modern 
science in principle from what preceded it will be struck by the formal 
resemblances discussed here." 
It is, I feel, worth the consideration of educators at all levels 
that perhaps some of the learning, and more specifically, reading 
problems that seem to afflict our Western culture (more so than in 
the East? [See Kiyoshi Makita, "The Rarity of Reading Disability 
in Japanese Children," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry~ 1968, 
38, pp. 599-613]) are due, at least in part, to the more widespread 
cultural phenomenon alluded to in the writings cited earlier in this 
paper. Is it possible that we are having to "pay the price for the 
spectacular successes in the sciences made possible by theorizing with 
disembodied concepts" (Arnheim), neglecting, moreover, to nurture 
the "experiential sources" within while proceeding to obliterate the 
"primal sanities" of nature in our environment? 
Perhaps we should reread and reevaluate in the twin lights of 
the psychology of perception and the philosophy of symbolic forms 
the much-quoted passage from Einstein's letter to Jacques Hadamard 
describing his own creative processes of thinking. 
The words of the language, as they are written or 
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism 
of thought. The psychical entities which seem to serve as 
elements of thought are certain signs and more or less 
clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced 
and combined ... Taken from a psychological view-
point, this combinatory play seems to be the essential 
feature in productive thought-before there is any con-
nection with logical construction in words or other kinds 
of signs which can be communicated to others ... The 
above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual 
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and some of muscular type. Conventional words or 
other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a 
secondary stage, when the mentioned associative play 
is sufficiently established and can be reproduced at will. 
(Hadamard, The Psychology of Invention in the Mathe-
matical Field, Princeton University Press, 1945). 
In this treatise, On the Aesthetic Education of Man J in a Series 
of LettersJ the German poet-philosopher and close friend of Goethe, 
Friedrich Schiller, predicted the outcome of perpetuating a system 
of education that was not based on the principles of aesthetic and 
therefore natural order. At this moment in history we would seem 
to be living the fulfillment of his prediction. 
The old principles will remain, but they will wear the 
dress of the century, and philosophy will lend its name to 
an oppression which was formerly authorized by the 
Church. Terrified by the freedom which always declares 
its hostility to their first attempts, men will in one place 
throw themselves into the arms of a comfortable servi-
tude, and in another, driven to despair by a pedantic 
tutelage, they will break out into the wild libertinism 
of the natural state. Usurpation will plead the weakness 
of human nature, insurrection its dignity, until at 
length the great sovereign of all human affairs, blind 
force, steps in to decide the sham conflict of principles 
like a common prize fight. 
